#7 - "Husserl's Phenomenology" (3 of 4)

We were only responsible for a set portion of this lengthy chapter, but I ended up reading the whole thing. I didn't feel like it was fair to Husserl to skip over all of Dr. Ferarra's hard work in compiling a rather succinct summary of his entire philosophy and development! Ah, but I didn't think it was fair? Let's not get referential ahead of our time...

Anyway, Chapter III is devoted entirely to Husserl's phenomenology. What it is, how it developed, the changes it went through during Husserl's own life and work, and how it differs from other forms of phenomenology (such as the hermeneutic phenomenology of Heidegger, which is to be discussed on its own later in the book). In this form of phenomenology the analyst attempts to bracket out his or her own views and opinions in order to then view the thing as it is, going "back to the things themselves."

We are also given, as laid out by Spiegelberg, six different phenomenological "methods." Those methods, or ways of analyzing something phenomenogically, are as follows:

1. Descriptive Phenomenology - this can "begin to sketch a sense of one's life-world." Kinds of 'subjective' descriptions usually abandoned by analysts (like color, emotion, sound) are here noted and described for their own sake.

2. Essential Phenomenology (Eidetic Phenomenology) - this attempts to boil down the object to it's essence. What elements would be impossible to take away without changing the object itself?

3. Phenomenology of Appearances - "one views not only what appears but how something appears." Every day objects are changed by varying factors like light, shading, and enviornment. In these different states, is it really the same object? What and how is it different?

4. Constitutive Phenomenology - In "constitutive" phenomenology one describes the manner in which and process through which the 'beingness' of the object reveals itself to the consciousness trying to percieve it.

5. Reductive Phenomenology - This is a tricky one, because it borders on meta-phenomenology. One runs the risk of merely "writing about phenomenology rather than doing phenomenology." It calls for total epoche, or suspension of the "natural attitude."

6. Hermeneutic Phenomenology - this method of phenomenological analysis attempts to bring in an element of referential experience. As I said, this is to be discussed on its own later in the book, and further descriptions of such were passed over at this time in favor of a discussion of Husserl's later works.

Those later works in question, Ideas, Cartesian Meditations, and Lebenswelt (or "life world" when translated from german), take his transcendental ideas one step farther, positing that while the ego is aware of itself first and then is aware of others, it can remove itself from its own consciousness one step more - becoming aware that the other egos are indeed "real" and regard us in the same way we regard them. This, unfortunately, is when he loses many. These further bifurcations are cited as Husserl's real downfall, the flaw in his theories. It would seem that many aren't able to make the jump that he did in seeing, at once, every conscious mind as both separate and one.

But isn't that the case with all of these philosophical arguments, that one really has to adhere to the worldview in order to truly understand it? Which isn't to say that by assuming the belief as your own for a second you can see whether or not it is true. What I mean is that in discussion, no matter how open someone wants to be, they will always be able to intuitively understand that which they are inclined to believe. And there, isn't that why they probably believe the things they do? It all goes back to the same question of prejudices, and those prejudices inherent in us being the thing stopping humankind from ever attaining true objectivity. I can't tell you how much I loved the bit about the inherent biases in spoken language itself rendering this kind of objectivity impossible. I speak with a level of fluency and near-fluency in several languages, and I know first hand these kinds of biases - biases which themselves are very, very difficult to explain in words. It's like trying to describe music to someone who can't hear, or the color "red" to a man blind from birth. Different languages feel different, they hold different groups of connotations in different combinations of words. The best way I think to describe this is, just as was said in the reading, by saying that these are "biases" developed in the language. Every word you speak is merely a symbolic reference to a thing outside of the reference, that has been developed over thousands of years, and they carry with them the traces of this history! In order to transcend this hurdle we would have to transcend all language - but then how would we communicate?

I recall reading somewhere recently a rather New Age theory about the potential of the human consciousness, that we would eventually reach a state where we would surpass language and "speak" to each other through pure mind bubbles of love.

Well, until that day, it looks like Husserl's critics are absolutely right.

#5 - "Should the Method Define the Tasks?" (2 of 4)

In this chapter Dr. Ferrara set about answering that very question. In order to do so in a way that would make sense to his reader, however, he first needed to provide us with some necessary background information, which is why this chapter was almost twenty pages long rather than a single page with a neatly printed "Yes." or "No."

The first order of business was defining the tasks we would be working with. Ferrara gave an admirably brief yet comprehensive overview and explanation of the theory and history of Husserl (the phenomenological analysis) and Heidegger (the hermeneutic analysis), and while there were others these two took up the bulk of the discussion along with their counterpart, the ever-present classical methods such as Shenkerian and Roman Numeral analysis.

There was also some interesting discussion about the nature of a work of art itself, and how whether something is an "art object" or a mere "object," or even if something is an "art object" if it is allowed to become an "asthetic object" based on the situations it which it is placed and the mindset of the viewer engaging with it (or, for that matter, the question of whether or not the viewer is engaging with the object at all!). That also brought up the point that just because a person may engage with a piece making it an "aesthetic object," without a deliberate creator, said object can be an "aesthetic object" without necessarily being an "art object."

Though I must take this moment to point out, I disagree with Ferrara on his example with the clouds. All of nature, in fact, is one beautiful "art object;" the masterful and very deliberate scheme of the ultimate Creator.

This reading was incredibly dense and I'm not entirely sure I understood it all due to the new vocabularies that seemed to be thrown at me every other sentence! I'm looking forward to the lecture tomorrow to clarify, or at least solidify in my own mind, these concepts. I think Ferrara summed things up beautifully in one of the very last sentences of the chapter when he stated that "being open and responsive to questions posed by the musical work provides the beginnings of true objectivity." Yes! It is strange, though...without having studied this kind of thing - and definately without the kind of background knowledge that someone like Ferrara or these other musicologists and analyists claim - this approach to music and "art objects" seems only natural! Could it be that moving into this new age, our consciousnesses are expanding, evolving? That as the barriers between us break down, everything truly is revealed, to the point that the knowledge for which scholars studied, sweated and toiled has seeped out into the ether where it is merely absorbed by the young minds coming into the world after them?


I wonder...